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a b s t r a c t
We give a rigorous deterministic polynomial time algorithm for
the modular inversion hidden number problem introduced by
D. Boneh, S. Halevi and N.A. Howgrave-Graham in 2001. For our
algorithm, we need to be given about 2/3 of the bits of the
output, which matches one of the heuristic algorithms of D. Boneh,
S. Halevi andN.A.Howgrave-Grahamandanswers one of their open
questions. However their more efficient algorithm that requires
only 1/3 of the bits of the output still remains heuristic.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Since Boneh and Venkatesan (1996, 1997) introduced the hidden number problem in 1996, it
has been generalised in a number of directions and has found a wide spectrum of applications in
cryptography and beyond, see Shparlinski (2005) for a survey of relevant results and also (Akavia,
2010) for some recent developments and a new approach. Here we consider a modification of the
original problem which has been introduced by Boneh et al. (2001).
More precisely, for a prime p, denote by Fp the field of p elements and always assume that it is
represented by the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Accordingly, sometimes, where obvious, we treat elements
of Fp as integer numbers in the above range.
For integers x andm ≥ 1, we denote by ⌊x⌋m the remainder of x on division bym. Given an integer
m and ℓ > 0, we denote by MSBℓ,m(x) any integer u such that
|⌊x⌋m − u| ≤ m/2ℓ+1.
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Roughly speaking, MSBℓ,m(x) gives ℓmost significant bits of the remainder of xmodulo m. However,
this definition is more flexible and suits our purposes better. In particular, we remark that ℓ in the
above inequality need not be an integer.
Following Boneh et al. (2001), we consider the followingModular InversionHiddenNumber Problem,
ModInv-HNP:
Recover a numberα ∈ Fp such that forN elements t1, . . . , tN ∈ Fp\{−α}, chosen independently
and uniformly at random; we are given N pairs
ti,MSBℓ,p

1
α + ti

, i = 1, . . . ,N,
for some ℓ > 0.
Besides being of independent interest and giving an interesting example of yet another natural
problem of this type, see Shparlinski (2005) for a survey, it has also been mentioned in Boneh et al.
(2001) as a building block for constructing efficient pseudorandom number generators and message
authentication codes. Motivated by these applications, here we modify and rigorously analyze the
algorithm outlined in Boneh et al. (2001, Section 3.1), using some ideas from Blackburn et al. (2003,
2005, 2006). We note that our algorithm works only if for some fixed ε > 0, we have ℓ > (2/3+ ε)k
for a sufficiently large k-bit prime p. In Boneh et al. (2001) one can find another algorithm together
with a heuristic argument that it works already for ℓ > (1/3+ε)k, however it seems quite difficult to
give a rigorous analysis of this algorithm, which can be a serious drawback in various cryptographic
applications of ModInv-HNP (see Boneh et al. (2001) for some possible applications).
Throughout the paper, we use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z.
1.2. Lattices and SVP problem
We recall that a latticeL is a set of all integer linear combinations of the form
L =

r
i=1
nibi | ni ∈ Z

,
for r linearly independent real vectors b1, . . . , br in the s dimensional Euclidean space Rs (note that
r ≤ s). The set {b1, . . . , br} is said to be a basis ofL.
One of the most fundamental problems in this area is the γ -shortest vector problem, γ -SVP: given
a real γ ≥ 1 and a basis of a lattice L in Rs, find a nonzero vector u ∈ L, with the Euclidean norm
∥u∥ nomore than γ times larger than the Euclidean norm of the shortest nonzero vector inL, that is,
∥u∥ ≤ γ min{∥w∥ : w ∈ L, w ≠ 0}.
For γ = 1, this problem is known as simply SVP, we refer to Gama and Nguyen (2008), Micciancio
and Voulgaris (2010), Nguyen and Stehlé (2009), Novocin et al. (2011) and Pujol and Stehlé (2009) for
the state of art and also surveys of previous results concerning different algorithms for γ -SVP.
1.3. Main results
We assume that we have access to a γ -SVP algorithm.
Theorem 1. Assume that for a prime number p, we are given n+ 1 pairs
ti,MSBℓ,p

1
α + ti

, i = 1, . . . , n+ 1,
with
(t1, . . . , tn+1) ∈

Fp \ {−α}
n+1
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chosen uniformly at random. Then α ∈ Fp can be recovered in deterministic polynomial time and a single
call to a γ -SVP algorithm on a (2n+ 2)-dimensional lattice with polynomially bounded basis, except with
probability
P ≤ 2
n+1(4h∆+ 1)3n+1
(p− 1)n +
4(4h∆+ 1)3
p− 1
over the choices of t1, . . . , tn+1, when it either returns no answer or returns a wrong answer, where
h = γ√2n+ 2 and ∆ = p/2ℓ+1 .
Theorem1 implies that for almost all evaluation points,ModInv-HNP can be solved in deterministic
polynomial time if ℓ > (2/3+ε)kwhere k is the bit length of p (for any constant ε > 0). The following
corollary gives a more precise statement, in two variants, using two different SVP approximation
algorithms. Although the run-time is polynomial in k for any constant ε in both cases, the dependence
on ε is different, and allows trading off a larger run-time for a smaller minimum allowed value of k.
Corollary 1. Fix ε and δ with 0 < δ < ε < 1. Let
n0 =

2
9ε

,
let p be a k-bit prime and let ℓ > (2/3 + ε)k. There exist deterministic algorithms A1 and A2 such that
given n0 + 1 pairs
ti,MSBℓ,p

1
α + ti

, i = 1, . . . , n0 + 1,
with
(t1, . . . , tn0+1) ∈

Fp \ {−α}
n0+1
chosen uniformly at random, for k ≥ kν the algorithmAν runs in time Tν , ν = 1, 2, and recovers α ∈ Fp
correctly with probability at least 1− p−δ over the choices of t1, . . . , tn0+1, where
k1 =

c1ε−1 log ε−1

and k2 =

c2ε−2
(log log ε−1)2
log ε−1

,
for some absolute effectively computable constants c1 and c2, and
T1 = (2ε−1k)O(1) and T2 = (ε−1k)O(1).
Proof. Plugging ∆ = 2k−ℓ+O(1) and p = 2k+O(1) in the first term of the error probability bound in
Theorem 1, and using that ℓ > (2/3+ ε)kwe see that
2n+1(4h∆+ 1)3n+1
(p− 1)n = h
3n+12(3n+1)((k−ℓ)+O(1))−(k+O(1))n
≤ h3n+12(3n+1)(k/3−kε+O(1))−(k+O(1))n
= 2(3n+1) log h+k/3−k(3n+1)ε+O(n).
Now a straightforward computation shows that the first term is upper bounded by p−δ/2 if the
condition
(3n+ 1) · (ε − k−1(log h+ C0)) ≥ 1/3+ δ (1)
is satisfied (with some sufficiently large absolute constant C0). Assuming
k ≥ (2 log h+ C1) · ε−1 (2)
for a sufficiently large absolute constant C1, and using that δ < ε, we see that n ≥ n0 implies (1).
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Furthermore, another straightforward computation shows that the second term in the error
probability of Theorem 1 is bounded by p−δ/2 if
k ≥ (3 log h+ C2) · (3ε − δ)−1
(for a suitable absolute constant C2). It is easy to see that this condition on k is implied by (1), provided
that C0 is large enough, using δ < ε.
ForA1, we apply the 1-SVP algorithm of Micciancio and Voulgaris (2010) to a lattice of dimension
s = 2n0 + 2, which gives h = √2n0 + 2.
ForA2, we use the 2O(s(log log s)
2/ log s)-SVP algorithm of Schnorr (1987) for s = 2n0 + 2, which gives
h = 2n0+1√2n0 + 2. Recalling the definition of n0, the stated bounds on k follow.
This completes the proof. 
Note that a trivial information theoretic lower bound on the number n0 + 1 of pairs
ti,MSBℓ,p

1
α + ti

, i = 1, . . . , n0,
needed to recover α is
n0 ≥ k− 1
ℓ
− 1,
since α has entropy at least k−1 bits, and each pair provides at most ℓ bits of information on α. Hence
for the parameter choice ℓ > (2/3+ ε)k, our algorithm works with n0 within a constant factor of the
lower bound, with a constant that varies inversely with ε.
2. Proof of Theorem 1
2.1. Algorithm
We assume that
2h∆ ≤ 6h∆2 < p (3)
since otherwise the result is trivial (as the claimed bound on the probability exceeds 1).
Assume that we are given n+ 1 pairs of integers ti, ui with
ui ≡ 1
α + ti + ei (mod p) (4)
for some integers ei with |ei| ≤ ∆, i = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
Rewriting these congruences as
α ≡ 1
ui − ei − ti (mod p),
and eliminating α, we obtain
1
u1 − e1 − t1 ≡
1
ui − ei − ti (mod p), i = 2, . . . , n+ 1,
which in turn implies
ui − ei − u1 + e1 ≡ (t1 − ti)(u1 − e1)(ui − ei) (mod p), (5)
for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
Denoting
Ai ≡ (t1 − ti)u1ui + u1 − ui (mod p),
B1,i ≡ −(t1 − ti)ui − 1 (mod p),
Bi,i ≡ −(t1 − ti)u1 + 1 (mod p),
Ci ≡ t1 − ti (mod p),
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we write (5) as
Ai + B1,ie1 + Bi,iei + Cie1ei ≡ 0 (mod p), i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
We now rescale the coefficients as
ai ≡ Ai∆−2 (mod p), b1,i ≡ B1,i∆−1 (mod p),
bi,i ≡ Bi,i∆−1 (mod p), ci ≡ Ci (mod p),
for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1, and notice that the vector
e = ∆2,∆e1, . . . ,∆en+1, e1e2, . . . , e1en+1
belongs to the latticeL consisting of solutions
x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn+1, x1,2, . . . , x1,n+1) ∈ Z2n+2
of the congruences
aix0 + b1,ix1 + bi,ixi + cix1,i ≡ 0 (mod p), i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
x0 ≡ 0 (mod ∆2),
xj ≡ 0 (mod ∆), j = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
(6)
We note that a (2n+ 2)× (2n+ 2) integral basis matrix
M = Mi,j2n+1i,j=0
whose rows generateL can be constructed efficiently as follows:
The first two columns are defined as follows: M0,0 = ∆2 and Mi,0 = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 2n + 1
(imposing the relation x0 ≡ 0 (mod ∆2)), and M1,1 = ∆ and Mi,1 = 0 for j ≠ 1 (relation x1 ≡ 0
(mod ∆)).
For j ∈ {2, . . . , n+ 1}, there are two possible cases:
• If Cj ≢ 0 (mod p), then Cj is invertible modulo p, and we set Mj,j = ∆ and Mi,j = 0 for i ≠ j
(we recall the relation xj ≡ 0 (mod ∆)) and M0,n+j ≡ −C−1j · Aj (mod p), M1,n+j ≡ −C−1j · B1,j
(mod p),Mj,n+j ≡ −C−1j ·Bj,j (mod p),Mn+j,n+j = p, andMi,n+j = 0 for i ∉ {0, 1, j, n+j} (we recall
the relation x1,i ≡ −c−1j · (ajx0 + b1,jx1 + bj,jxj) (mod p)).
• If Cj ≡ 0 (mod p), then the relations xj ≡ 0 (mod ∆) and xj ≡ −ajx0 − b1,jx1 (mod p) hold.
Since p and ∆ are coprime, the latter two congruences are equivalent to the single congruence
xj ≡ ∆ ·

∆−1

p · (−ajx0 − b1,jx1) (mod p∆). Consequently, we set M0,j ≡ −∆2 ·

∆−1

p · Aj
(mod p∆),M1,j ≡ −∆2 ·

∆−1

p · B1,j (mod p∆),Mj,j = p∆ andMi,j = 0 for i ∉ {0, 1, j} (relation
xj ≡ ∆ ·

∆−1

p · (−ajx0 − b1,jx1) (mod p∆)), and Mn+j,n+j = 1 and Mi,n+j = 0 for i ≠ n + j
(we recall the relation x1,n+j ∈ Z).
Clearly the Euclidean norm ∥e∥ of e satisfies the inequality
∥e∥ ≤ ∆4 + · · · +∆41/2 ≤ √2n+ 2∆2.
We run the γ -SVP algorithm on the latticeL. Let
f = (∆2f0,∆f1, . . . ,∆fn+1, f1,2, . . . , f1,n+1) ∈ L,
where f0, . . . , fn+1, f1,2, . . . , f1,n+1 ∈ Z, be the returned approximation to the shortest nonzero vector
inL. So
∥f∥ ≤ γ · ∥e∥ ≤ γ√2n+ 2 ·∆2 = h ·∆2.
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We have
|f0| ≤ ∥f∥∆−2 ≤ h,
|fi| ≤ ∥f∥∆−1 ≤ h ·∆, i = 1, . . . , n+ 1,
|f1,i| ≤ ∥f∥ ≤ h ·∆2, i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
(7)
We now consider the vector
d = (0,∆d1, . . . ,∆dn+1, d1,2, . . . , d1,n+1) = f0e− f,
where
di = f0ei − fi, i = 1, . . . , n+ 1,
and
d1,i = f0e1ei − f1,i i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
Observe that if di = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} and also f0 ≠ 0, then we can compute ei = fi/f0.
To decidewhich of the integral ratios fi/f0 is indeed equal to ei, we perform the following ‘‘consistency
check’’:
• We form the set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n+ 1} of i = 1, . . . , n+ 1 with integral values of fi/f0 and ui ≢ fi/f0
(mod p). For every i ∈ I, we compute
βi ≡ 1ui − fi/f0 − ti (mod p), 0 ≤ βi < p,
and also define hij, j = 1, . . . , n+ 1, by the conditions
hij ≡ 1
βi + tj − uj (mod p), |hij| < p/2,
(again discarding the values of i for which at least one inversion fails).
• We now choose the smallest i0 ∈ I for which for all j = 1, . . . , n + 1, the values hi0j exist and
satisfy |hi0j| ≤ ∆, and return βi0 . Otherwise we return failure.
2.2. Necessary conditions for failure
Let us define the quantities
Ei = d1,i − d1ei − die1, i = 2, . . . , n+ 1. (8)
Let us define the ‘‘bad’’ events
E1 : di ≠ 0 or Ei ≠ 0, for every i = 2, . . . , n+ 1,
E2 : f0 = 0 and E1 does not hold,
E3 : α ≠ βi0 and E1 and E2 do not hold.
Note that we ignore the case of d1 ≠ 0 as below we shown in Section 2.4 that E2 implies d1 = 0.
As observed above, our algorithm succeeds (that is, βi0 = α) if E1, E2 and E3 do not occur.
We now upper bound the probability of these bad events over the choice of t1, . . . , tn+1, chosen
uniformly at random from Fp \ {−α}.
We first derive some useful relations satisfied by the difference vector d. Using the first n
congruences in (6), we find that
b1,i∆d1 + bi,i∆di + cid1,i ≡ 0 (mod p). (9)
Note that for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1, we have
|di| = |f0ei − fi| ≤ h|ei| + |fi| ≤ 2h ·∆ (10)
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and also for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1,
|d1,i| = |f0e1ei − f1,i| ≤ h|e1ei| + |f1,i| ≤ 2h ·∆2. (11)
We see that (9) implies
B1,id1 + Bi,idi + Cid1,i ≡ 0 (mod p), i = 2, . . . , n+ 1. (12)
Recalling the definition of B1,i, Bi,i, Ci, we find that
−d1 ((t1 − ti)ui + 1)+ di (−(t1 − ti)u1 + 1)+ d1,i(t1 − ti) ≡ 0 (mod p),
or
(t1 − ti)
−d1ui − diu1 + d1,i ≡ d1 − di (mod p).
Finally, using (4), we derive a quadratic congruence in ti:
Ui · t2i + Vi · ti +Wi ≡ 0 (mod p), i = 2, . . . , n+ 1, (13)
where
Ui ≡ di
α + t1 − Ei (mod p),
Vi ≡ (t1 − α) ·

Ei − di
α + t1

+ di (mod p),
Wi ≡ α · (di − d1)+ t1 ·
 −diα
α + t1 − d1 + αEi

(mod p),
(14)
and Ei is given by (8), i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
2.3. Estimating the probability of E1
Assume thatE1 holds. Let us fix somevalues of t1, di for i = 1, . . . , n+1, and d1,i for i = 2, . . . , n+1.
We now consider the number of n-tuples
(t2, . . . , tn+1) ∈

Fp \ {−α}
n
satisfying (13).
We claim that for every i = 2, . . . , n+ 1, the left hand side of (13) is a non-constant polynomial of
degree at most 2 in ti and hence has at most 2 solutions for ti. Thus we have at most 2n such n-tuples.
Indeed, by our assumption, we know that either di ≠ 0 or Ei ≠ 0 holds.
In the case di ≠ 0, using the inequality |di| ≤ 2h ·∆ < p, see (3), we have di ≢ 0 (mod p). There
are two subcases to consider:
• If Ei ≡ 0 (mod p), then (14) shows that Ui ≢ 0 (mod p).• If Ei ≢ 0 (mod p) then Ui ≡ 0 (mod p) if and only if we have α + t1 ≡ di/Ei (mod p), which
implies that Vi ≡ di (mod p) and hence Vi ≢ 0 (mod p).
So the claim holds if di ≠ 0.
In the case di = 0 and Ei ≠ 0, from (11), we have that |Ei| ≤ 6h∆2 < p, so, recalling (3), we see
that Ei ≢ 0 (mod p), and then (14) shows that Ui ≢ 0 (mod p), as claimed.
Now, we see from (10) that the tuple (d1, . . . , dn+1) can take atmost (4h∆+1)n+1 possible values.
Furthermore, using the inequality |Ei| ≤ 6h∆2, we also see that the tuple (E2, . . . , En+1) takes at most
(12h∆2 + 1)n possible values. Since t1 can take p − 1 possible values and (t2, . . . , tn+1) at most 2n
possible values, we conclude that there are at most
2n(4h∆+ 1)n+1(12h∆2 + 1)n(p− 1) < 2n(4h∆+ 1)3n+1(p− 1)
tuples (t1, . . . , tn+1) for which the bad event E1 happens. So the probability of E1 is at most
Pr[E1] ≤ 2
n(4h∆+ 1)3n+1
(p− 1)n . (15)
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2.4. Estimating the probability of E2
We first claim that E2 implies d1 = 0. Indeed,¬E1 means that there exists j ∈ {2, . . . , n+ 1} such
that dj = 0 and Ej = 0. Then from (14), we see that Uj = Vj = 0 andWj = −(α + t1) · d1. Hence (13)
implies that Wj ≡ 0 (mod p), which leads to d1 ≡ 0 mod p (since α + t1 ≢ 0 (mod p)) and hence
d1 = 0 (since |d1| < 2h∆ < p).
Now, let us consider the set
S = {i ∈ {2, . . . , n+ 1} : Ei = 0 and di = 0},
and denote its size by k. We claim that k < n. Indeed, from (8), we see that for each i ∈ S we have
Ei = d1,i. Therefore, if k = n thenwe have di = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n+1 and d1,i = 0 for i = 2, . . . , n+1,
which implies (since f0 = 0) that f = 0, a contradiction. Thus we must have k < n.
Now, let us fix t1, di for i = 2, . . . , n + 1, and d1,i for i = 2, . . . , n + 1 and consider, for
i = 2, . . . , n+ 1 the number of solutions for ti satisfying (13). If i ∈ S, then the left hand side of (13)
is the zero polynomial so ti has p possible values. If i ∉ S, we have di ≠ 0 or Ei ≠ 0 so (as shown in
the analysis of E1 above) the left hand side of (13) is a non-constant polynomial of degree at most 2
and hence there are at most 2 possible values for ti. Overall there are at most 2n−k(p − 1)k solutions
for (t2, . . . , tn+1). There are p− 1 possible values for t1. Furthermore, as before we see that there are
at most (12h∆2 + 1)n−k possible values for Ei and (4h∆ + 1)n−k possible values for di with i ∉ S. So
overall, there are at most
2n−k(4h∆+ 1)n−k(12h∆2 + 1)n−k(p− 1)k+1 < 2n−k(4h∆+ 1)3(n−k)(p− 1)k+1
tuples (t1, . . . , tn+1) for which the bad event E2 happens. So, since k < n, the probability of E2 is at
most
Pr[E2] ≤
n−1
k=0

2(4h∆+ 1)3
p− 1
n−k
≤
∞
r=1

2(4h∆+ 1)3
p− 1
r
. (16)
We see that
Pr[E2] ≤ 4(4h∆+ 1)
3
p− 1 . (17)
Indeed, for 2(4h∆ + 1)3/(p − 1) ≥ 1/2 it is obvious as we always have Pr[E2] ≤ 1; otherwise it
follows from (16).
2.5. Estimating the probability of E3
If E3 holds, then we have that βi0 and α ≠ βi0 satisfy the relations
1
βi0 + tj
− uj ≡ hi0j (mod p)
and
1
α + tj − uj ≡ ej (mod p),
for j = 1, . . . , n + 1. Subtracting the last two relations and multiplying by (α + tj) · (βi0 + tj), we
obtain the relation
α − βi0 ≡ (hi0j − ej)(α + tj)(βi0 + tj) mod p,
with |hi0j| ≤ ∆, j = 1, . . . , n + 1. Clearly for every fixed βi0 and hi0j there are at most two possible
values of tj. Since there are p − 1 possibilities of βi0 and at most 2∆ + 1 possibilities for every hi0j,
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j = 1, . . . , n+ 1, as before we conclude that
Pr[E3] ≤ (2∆+ 1)
n(p− 1)
(p− 1)n+1 =
(2∆+ 1)n
(p− 1)n ≤ Pr[E1]
which together with (15) and (17) concludes the proof.
3. Remarks
We note that a slightly more careful analysis of the event E2 in the proof of Theorem 1 allows to
show that k = n − 1 with probability O(∆2/p) which improves the second term in the probability
estimate of Theorem 1. This however does not change the 2/3-threshold in Corollary 1. It remains
a challenging open problem to get a rigorous version of the other (presumably more powerful)
algorithm of Boneh et al. (2001) (or its appropriate modification) which can potentially lead to
replacing 2/3 with 1/3. This algorithm is based on the ideas of Coppersmith (1997, 2001). However
the rigorous analysis of this approach seems to be much more difficult which we pose as an open
question.
It is also interesting to check whether the recently emerged approach of Akavia (2010) can be
applied to ModInv-HNP.
More generally, it is certainly interesting to study a general problem of recovering an unknown
rational function ψ(X) ∈ Fp(X) from a sequence of k pairs

ti,MSBℓ,p (ψ(ti))

, i = 1, . . . , k.
Finally, it appears that ModInv-HNP in the case when the modulus p is also hidden is a muchmore
difficult problem towhich no feasible approaches are known at themoment. Thus this could be a very
promising cryptographic primitive.
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